Whether the Second Amendment permits categorical disarmament of non-violent felons under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) without an individualized assessment of dangerousness

No question identified. : violence. Mr. Mancilla had been transporting cocaine from Mexico to the United States on a bus. Agents discovered the cocaine on his seat at a border checkpoint. He was sentenced to 27 months in prison. 2. More than 12 years later, on October 29, 2022, Mr. Mancilla and his cousin were arrested at a gun show in Fort Worth, Texas while purchasing firearms. Mr. Mancilla was eventually indicted on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for knowingly possessing a firearm despite having previously been convicted of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” The government used Mr. Mancilla’s decade-old drug conviction as the predicate offense for the § 922(g)(1) charge. Mr. Mancilla has no other felony convictions. 3. At the district court, Mr. Mancilla moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment both facially and as applied to him. On April 12, 2023, in a one-page order, the district court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment. The next day, Mr. Mancilla entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the indictment. On September 7, 2023, the district court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Mr. Mancilla to 42 months’ imprisonment. 4. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Mr. Mancilla argued that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because he was convicted of a non-violent felony and posed no physical harm to others. A divided panel affirmed the district court and held that application of § 922(g)(1) to Mr. Mancilla was constitutional. App. A. The majority concluded that it was bound by United States v. Kimble, 142 F.4th 308 (5th Cir. 2025), which held that § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on gun possession by an individual convicted of drug-trafficking felonies is consistent with New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Relying on Kimble, the majority held that Mr. Mancilla’s “predicate conviction[] for drug trafficking convey[s] that he belongs to a class of dangerous felons that our regulatory tradition permits legislatures to disarm.” App. A. As such, it held that Mr. Mancilla “may be constitutionally disarmed without an individualized assessment that [he] is dangerous.” App. A. Chief Judge Elrod, concurring, wrote that while “the majority opinion is a correct statement of law” in the Fifth Circuit, “[wJere [she] writing on a blank slate” she would require “a more individualized assessment of dangerousness ... when adjudicating as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).” App. A. She reasoned that many historical analogues imposing categorical, class-based disarmament allowed a person “an opportunity to make individualized showing that he himself [was] not actually dangerous.” App. A. Chief Judge Elrod also observed that Mr. Mancilla’s predicate conviction “is one of the ‘occasional[]’ cases of possession with intent to distribute that ‘did not involve a weapon or any m violence.’”” App. A. Judge Graves dissented. He disagreed that Fifth Circuit precedent “forecloses an individualized assessment” and instead believed that “an individualized assessment of dangerousness is appropriate here.” App. A. 5. As Chief Judge Elrod in concurrence acknowledged, the Fifth Circuit’s decision entrenches “a robust circuit split” on the proper framework for analyzing as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1). App. A. The circuits are split on whether as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are permitted or whether, instead, the government can categorically bar all felons from possessing firearms. In addition, among the circuits that permit as-applied challenges, they are additionally split on whether the Second Amendment requires an individualized assessment of dangerousness before the government can permanently disarm any convicted felon, including one convicted of a drug trafficking crime, under § 922(g)(1), or instead wh