Whether the government bears the burden of proving a firearm regulation is consistent with the historical tradition of arms regulation under the Second Amendment, or whether a challenger must first demonstrate that the regulation implicates conduct protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment

No question identified. : 1. The Fourth Circuit issued its opinion and entered judgment on September 30, 2025. Without an extension, the petition for a writ of certiorari would be due on December 29, 2025. With the requested extension, the petition would be due on January 28, 2025. The Court’s jurisdiction will be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). In accordance with Supreme Court Rule 13.5, petitioner is filing this application at least ten days before the current due date. Petitioner has not previously sought an extension of the deadline. 2.a. Mr. Taylor was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for unlawfully possessing a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(0). App. 2a. Mr. Taylor moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(0) violates the Second Amendment under the test articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). App. 2a. Mr. Taylor argued § 922(0) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. The district court denied his motion, and Mr. Taylor pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. App. 2a. b. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam, unpublished opinion. App. 2a-3a. The panel concluded that § 922(0) is constitutional because the plain text of the Second Amendment only protects weapons in common use for a lawful purpose, and machineguns are not in common use for lawful purposes. App. 2a-3a. c. The Fourth Circuit’s judgment warrants this Court’s review. The Fourth Circuit has misapplied the Bruen test by requiring the party challenging a firearm regulation to show that the regulation is inconsistent with this Nation’s history of firearm regulation. But, as one member of this Court has already noted, that “place[s] the burden of producing historical evidence on the wrong party.” Snope v. Brown, 145 S. Ct. 1534, 1537 (2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). Initially, “a challenger need only show that ‘the plain text’ of the Second Amendment covers his conduct.” Jd. at 1536 (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 32). Anda challenger can meet that burden by showing that “the law at issue ‘regulates’ Americans’ ‘arms-bearing conduct.” Jd. (quoting United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691 (2024)). Then, “it is the government’s burden to show that a historical limit on the right to bear arms nevertheless justifies its regulation.” Jd. Thus, it should have been the government’s burden—not Mr. Taylor’s—to show that § 922(0) is consistent with a “historical limit” on the Second Amendment right. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion also mistakenly relies on District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) to conclude that “machineguns are not in common use for a lawful purpose.” App. 3a. But Heller did not address a machinegun ban, so its offhand remarks about machineguns are dicta and not binding. As this Court explained in Heller, “[i]t is inconceivable that we would rest our interpretation of the basic meaning of any guarantee of the Bill of Rights upon ... dictum in a case where the point was not at issue and was not argued.” 554 U.S. at 625 n.25. Indeed, Heller did not attempt to “clarify the entire field,” and left it to future courts to “expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions” to the Second Amendment. Id. at 635. d. Mr. Taylor’s petition will argue that the Court should grant review to step in and correct the Fourth Circuit’s analytical mistakes. First, this Court should clarify that the government, not the challenger, has the burden to show that its regulation is consistent with a well-established and relevantly similar historical regulation. And second, this Court should reaffirm that instead of treating Heller's dicta as dispositive, courts have an obligation to independently assess whether challenged firearm regulations are “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. 3.