Whether the Sixth Circuit improperly applied qualified immunity by resolving disputed factual issues in an excessive force case without proper adversarial briefing

No question identified. : date. See S. Ct. R. 13.5. This Court’s jurisdiction would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). 2. The Sixth Circuit panel majority committed a grave violation of the partypresentation principle in this case. Mr. Feagin brought an excessive force claim against officers who tased him; the tasing incident was captured on video. At summary judgment, the police officers argued they were entitled to qualified immunity because Mr. Feagin was resisting arrest when they tased him, citing their own affidavits and police reports as proof. Mr. Feagin disputed this account, citing the video evidence and his own affidavit. The district court denied qualified immunity upon finding a genuine dispute of material fact: It concluded that a reasonable jury could view the video and agree with Mr. Feagin that he was not resisting arrest at the time he was tased. Respondents appealed from that denial, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the officers’ affidavits and reports conclusively established that Mr. Feagin was actively resisting arrest at the time officers tased him. Appellate courts lack jurisdiction over this kind of fact-based argument in an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal. But the panel majority nonetheless reversed, and did so by relying on a host of grounds Respondents elected not to raise. The complete lack of adversarial briefing on the issues decided by the Sixth Circuit majority resulted in both egregious factual errors and a sea change in the Sixth Circuit’s law on taser use. 3. Good cause exists for a 30-day extension of time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from the Sixth Circuit’s decision. In particular, an extension is justified by the press of business on numerous other pending matters. Among other things, undersigned counsel has an opening brief due February 17 in Perez v. Bondi, No. 21-70023 (9th Cir.); a petition for a writ of certiorari due February 17 in Hutton v. United States, No. 24-2202 (9th Cir.); an oral argument on February 18 on a motion to dismiss in Amigo Shuttle Inc. v. Port Authority of N.Y. & N.J., No. 653497/2025 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty.); and a cert reply expected to be filed on February 23, 2025 in Buyer v. United States, No. 25-576 (U.S.). Pending matters for Applicant’s other counsel include a reply brief due February 10, 2025 in Johnson & Johnson v. Monroe, No. A26A0410(Ga. App. Ct) and ongoing pretrial matters in Glencore Ltd. v. Louis Dreyfus Company B.V., No. 23-cv-11125 (S.D.N.Y.). 4, The requested 30-day extension would cause no prejudice to Respondents. 5. For the foregoing reasons, Applicant hereby requests that an extension of time be granted, up to and including March 12, 2026, within which to file a petition for certiorari. Respectfully submitted, /s/Daniel A. Rubens Daniel A. Rubens Counsel of Record ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP 51 West 52nd Street New York, NY 10019 (212) 506-5000 drubens@orrick.com January 27, 2026