Whether a plaintiff can successfully bring a malicious prosecution claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when acquitted of criminal charges and alleging lack of probable cause despite providing exculpatory evidence during the initial investigation

No question identified. : Charles Kakembo Sessanga February, 03, 2026 1000 Grandy”s Ln Apt 2409 Lewisville, Tx 77057 972-834-6575 Case: 24-11050 Document: 51-1 Page:1 Date Filed: 10/08/2025 Gnited States Court of Appeals for the fifth Circutt United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED October 8, 2025 Lyle W. Cayce Clerk No. 24-11050 CHARLES KAKEMBO SESSANGA, versus City OF DESoTO, Police Department; J. ACOSTA, Detective, In his Individual Capacity; D. BYERLY, Officer, In his Individual and Official Capacity; P. SCHULTE, Officer, In his Individual and Official Capacity, KaTHRYN SucGs, Prosecutor, In her Individual and Official Capacity, Defendants— Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas USDC No. 3:24-CV-950 Before ELROD, Chief Judge, and CLEMENT and HAYNES, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:” Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Kakembo Sessanga appeals from the sua sponte dismissal of his lawsuit for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As Sessanga has failed to state a claim for relief and has already pleaded his best case, the judgment of the district court dismissing the case “This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5TH Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-11050 Document:51-1 Page:2 Date Filed: 10/08/2025 No. 24-11050 with prejudice and denying Sessanga’s motion to amend the complaint is AFFIRMED. I We recite in brief the underlying facts as pleaded by Sessanga. In 2018, after a series of familial disputes, Sessanga’s wife contacted CPS to report concerns as to the welfare of her brother’s children. Sessanga’s wife’s sister-in-law then sent a vulgar text message to Sessanga’s wife stating, among other things, that she had reported Sessanga for sexual abuse of her daughter. On their own accord, Sessanga and his wife went to the police station to meet with a detective to provide their account of the events, including the disputes that preceded the report, and evidence, including the vulgar text messages from the complainant and video showing that the children had run away from their mother, the complainant. The detective continued with the investigation despite the evidence they provided. Asa result of this investigation, Sessanga was prosecuted and indicted for continuous sexual abuse of a child. Sessanga proceeded to trial, where he was acquitted. As a result of these events, Sessanga missed several financial opportunities. Sessanga sued the DeSoto Police Department, the detective, two police officers, and a prosecutor for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His case was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended sua sponte that the district court dismiss the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) as he was proceeding én forma pauperis. Sessanga objected in writing to the recommendation, but the district court adopted the findings of the magistrate judge and dismissed the case with prejudice. Case: 24-11050 Document: 51-1 Page:3 Date Filed: 10/08/2025 No. 24-11050 II A We review a sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (ii) de novo, applying the same standards that we use for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.! Legate v. Livingston, 822 F.3d 207, 209-210 (5th Cir. 2016). While we hold the pleadings of pro se plaintiffs to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” pro se plaintiffs must still plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’” Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). B To state a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, plaintiffs must plead: (1) the commencement or continuance of an original criminal proceeding; (2) its legal causation by the present defendant against plaintiff who was defendant in the original proceeding; (3) its bona fide termination in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) the absence of probable cause for such proceeding; (5) malice; and (6) damages.” Armstro