Whether the Second Hickenlooper Amendment applies to property expropriation claims involving foreign state assets that have not been brought within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States

No question identified. : consulted with counsel for Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co. (‘Helmerich”)—the plaintiff in this case and appellee below—and Helmerich does not oppose the extension sought in this application. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit entered judgment on October 3, 2025. A copy of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion is attached as Exhibit 1. See Helmerich & Payne Int Drilling Co. v. Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., 153 F.4th 1316 (D.C. Cir. 2025). A copy of the D.C. Circuit’s judgment is attached as Exhibit 2. The D.C. Circuit denied PDVSA’s and PPSA’s timely petition for rehearing en banc on December 3, 2025. A copy of the order denying rehearing is attached as Exhibit 3. This Court’s jurisdiction would be invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). PDVSA’s and PPSA’s time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court will currently expire on Tuesday, March 3, 2026. This application is being filed more than 10 days before that date. While undersigned counsel are still evaluating potential issues to be raised in a certiorari petition, counsel currently expect that the petition will present at least one question regarding the “Second Hickenlooper Amendment,” 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2), which narrows the applicability of the act of state doctrine. The act of state doctrine “precludes the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own U.S.-recognized government—i.e., Venezuela’s National Assembly, as elected in 2015. See Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Petrdleos de Venezuela S.A. v. MUFG Union Bank, N.A., 1:19-cv-10023-KPF (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2025), ECF No. 393; see also Jiménez v. Palacios, 250 A.3d 814, 828-841 (Del. Ch. 2019), aff'd, 237 A.3d 68 (Del. 2020). 2 territory.” Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964). The doctrine thus provides a defense to a claim premised on a foreign state’s confiscation of property in alleged violation of international law. See id. at 428. The Second Hickenlooper Amendment, however, precludes U.S. courts from applying the act of state doctrine in a case where “a claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking * * * by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international law.” 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2). As this Court recently explained, Congress enacted the Second Hickenlooper Amendment “to permit adjudication of claims” like those that the Court “had avoided” in Sabbatino, which held that the act of state doctrine required the lower courts to accept the validity of Cuba’s claim to funds held in a New York account, even though they were “attributable * * * to the sale of expropriated sugar.” Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 604 U.S. 115, 119-121, 132 (2025) (citation omitted). Consistent with that history and the provision’s text, the Second Hickenlooper Amendment for decades has generally been understood to apply only to disputes over “right[s] to [confiscated] property” (or rights to property “trace[able] through[] a confiscation”) when such property has been brought into the United States and thus falls within the jurisdiction of a U.S. court. The Second and Fifth Circuits, New York Court of Appeals, and Texas Supreme Court have expressly held that the Second Hickenlooper Amendment “is inapplicable” when “neither the nationalized property nor its proceeds are located in the United States.” Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, 3 S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1982); accord United Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 786-787 (Tex. 1977); see also Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir. 1981) (explaining that § 2370(e)(2) “has been interpreted in this Circuit as applying only to cases in which the exprop