Whether the First Amendment requires proof of a speaker's subjective wrongful intent in order for speech to be deemed a 'true threat' subject to criminal prosecution and conviction

QUESTION PRESENTED Casey Brandon Sibley was charged and convicted of threatening or intimidating pursuant to ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 13-1202(A)(1). Under ARIZ.REV.STAT. §13-1202(A)(1) [a] person commits threatening or intimidating if the person threatens or intimidates by word or conduct: 1. To cause physical injury to another person or serious damage to the property of another The prior version of ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 13-1202(A)(1) provided that a person commits threatening or intimidating if such person with the intent to terrify threatens or intimidates by word or conduct ... [t]o cause physical injury to another person or serious damage to property of another. 1978 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 201, § 128 (emphasis added). In 1994, the legislature amended ARIZ.REV.STAT. § 13-1202(A) by deleting the phrase “with the intent to terrify.” 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 200, § 11. Consequently, since the effective date of the 1994 amendment, a person commits threatening or intimidating without proof of the speaker’s subjective wrongful intent.1! 1 Nor can a subjective wrongful intent element be read into the statute due to the Arizona Legislatures removal of such ii The Arizona Court of Appeals found no violation of the First Amendment because it deemed Sibley’s speech a “true threat” despite their being no consideration of the speaker’s subjective intent. This analysis (1) flouts this Court’s controlling precedent, (2) conflicts with the Ninth, Tenth, and Seventh Circuit decisions regarding free speech protection and “true threats”, and (8) deepens an existing conflict amongst state courts of last resort. Finally, this case allows this Court the opportunity to definitively and unequivocally establish the definition of a “true threat” as required by the First Amendment for such speech to be deemed unprotected and subject to criminal prosecution and conviction. The question presented is: Whether the First Amendment requires proof of a speaker’s subjective wrongful intent in order for speech to be deemed a “true threat” subject to criminal prosecution and conviction. requirement. State v. Averyt, 179 Ariz. 123, 128 (App. 1994) (‘When the legislature modifies the language of a statute, we must presume it intended to change the existing law.”).