Does a statute criminalizing electronically communicated speech that is both intended and reasonably likely to annoy, alarm, or embarrass another person prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to the statute's legitimate sweep, thus violating the First Amendment?

QUESTION PRESENTED Texas criminalizes the repeated sending of “electronic communications in a manner reasonably likely to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, embarrass, or offend another,” if those communications are sent “with intent to harass, annoy, alarm, abuse, torment, or embarrass another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.07(a)(7). Texas appellate courts have held that section 42.07(a)(7) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. And Texas’s highest criminal court—which has upheld the subsection of section 42.07(a) that includes the same intent and “reasonably likely” benchmarks—has repeatedly refused to review the subsection at issue here. The Supreme Court of Montana has upheld a similar statute, while the high courts of Colorado and New York have held that functionally identical statutes are unconstitutionally overbroad. The question presented is: Does a_ statute criminalizing electronically communicated speech that is both intended and reasonably likely to annoy, alarm, or embarrass another person prohibit a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to the statute’s legitimate sweep, thus violating the First Amendment?