Issue: The issue is not Fed. Rul. of Civ. Pro. 8(a); the issue is the plaintiff was not allowed to be the "master of the complaint" and his rights under §35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.

1. Cole did not conduct Lucio's evaluation' under 8J of the CBA and the United Federation of Teacher did not process his grievance under 8J. The allegation of Cole's alleged racial animus is intertwined with the CBA and the Taylor Law.

Hon. Cogan stated (Appendix D): The Taylor Law also has nothing to do with this case. Plaintiff was either discriminated against because he is white and/or disabled, or not. That is all there is to this case, and if plaintiff does not stick to the facts showing those claims and those facts only, the case is going to be dismissed. See Doc. No. 37 in the appendix and at 17.

Hon. Cogan stated (Appendix D): "(There may be prohibitions in the collective bargaining agreement that prohibit these kinds of actions, but those can only be enforced by the union, and so have nothing to do with plaintiff's case.)" See Doc. No. 37 in the appendix and at 13.

Questions: 1)Is Hon. Cogan allowed to be "master of Lucio's complaint"? 2) Can a judge threat a litigant with dismissal if the litigant did not take out the facts (enactment of administrative regulations) and laws that establishes a constitutional claim under the Contract Clause? 3) Does §1981 and Title VII prohibit impairment of contractual obligation? 4) Does §1981 and Title VII prohibit retaliation by not honoring the collective bargaining agreement? 5) Can the Petitioner use state law (such as the Taylor Law) to establish the legal obligation for the collective bargaining agreement under § 1981 and Title VII? 6) Does a state statute and a state's constitution create a property under the 14th Amendment?

Hon. Cogan stated: "the law does not prohibit an employer from acting unfairly," when the Respondents enacted administrative regulations to impair their legal obligations in the CBA, the Taylor Law, and New York State's Constitution Article 1, §17, which is a public-sector contract.

Questions: 1) Does the Contract Clause continue to protect impairments of contracts by enacting administration regulations to avoid legal obligations under the Taylor Law, New York State's Constitution Article 1, §17, and the City of New York's Charter?

Lucio cited binding arbitration decisions that were impaired because of administrative regulations. Example, Lucio cited serval arbitration decisions that provided the Petitioner with more rights than what is found in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) and Respondent Bernard answered "Oh, we can't speak about that now" when Petitioner was given documents that did not match what was shown to him or read to him.

Questions: 1) Does a municipally impair their obligation to a binding arbitration clause found in a collective bargaining agreement when an administrative agency enacts a regulation to cause the impairment? 2) Does Contract Clause prohibit impairments of binding arbitration found in public-sector contracts?

According to the panel ofjudges' order, Hon. Cogan was providing Lucio with legal guidance and advice on how to plead facts.

Questions: May Lucio

Whether a plaintiff should be allowed to plead facts related to a collective bargaining agreement and administrative regulations under §1981 and Title VII