Whether the religious autonomy doctrine derives from the First Amendment or is a consent-based doctrine applicable only to disputes between a church and its own members

QUESTIONS PRESENTED More than 150 years ago, this Court held that courts may “exercise no jurisdiction” over matters that concern theological controversy or church discipline. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). Since then, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed this religious autonomy doctrine, explaining that the First Amendment guarantees a “spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952). The decision below threatens to eviscerate that guarantee. According to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, the autonomy that religious organizations enjoy derives not from the First Amendment, but from the “consent” of their “members.” Accordingly, in its view, courts are free to intrude into and resolve questions of doctrine and faith, so long as they do so at the behest of a “non-member.” Deepening a split among the lower courts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court also concluded that the religious autonomy doctrine operates not as a jurisdictional doctrine at the threshold, but rather as an affirmative defense that requires courts to resolve fact-bound disputes of religious doctrine such as whether baptism is an inherently public act and what constitutes “membership” in a religious organization. The questions presented are: 1. Whether the religious autonomy doctrine derives from the First Amendment or rather is a ii consent-based doctrine applicable only to disputes between a church and one of its own members. 2. Whether the religious autonomy doctrine is a threshold jurisdictional issue or an affirmative defense.