Whether the trial court's incorrect instruction on aiding and abetting liability violated the constitutional jury trial guarantees of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Did the trial court's incorrect instruction on aiding and abetting liability violate the constitutional jury trial guarantees of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments in all criminal prosecutions? In this case, petitioner and her codefendant were charged with committing the same murder. The prosecution’s evidence failed to prove the identity of the actual killer. California law differentiates between the criminal liability of the actual perpetrator and the aider and abettor. The settled law establishes that aiding and abetting liability is based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental state. The trial court erred by instructing petitioner’s jury otherwise. The court instructed that persons involved in committing a crime are principals in that crime. In contravention of the settled law, the court further instructed: “Each principal, regardless of the extent or manner of participation, is equally guilty.” This Court has recognized that constitutional error occurs when a trial court incorrectly instructs the jury on the elements of the crime. California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 4 (1996); Neder v. United States, 527 USS. 1, 15 (1999); Boyde v. California 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). Under the Fifth Amendment, the prosecution must prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson v. New York 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). The Sixth i Amendment requires that determination to be made by the jury. Apprendi v. New Jersey 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). Consequently, an instruction lightening the prosecution’s burden of proof violates the accused's right to ajury trial. United States v. Gaudin 515 US. 506, 519 (1995). This case asks the Court to resolve the question of whether the trial court’s incorrect instruction that all principals are equally guilty usurped the jury’s factfinding function in a manner that impermissibly lightened the prosecution’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in this case in which the prosecution’s proof did not reveal whether petitioner or codefendant Daveggio, or both, committed the physical acts that caused Vanessa Samson’s death. ili