In ordinary trust and property disputes, does the Establishment Clause preclude courts from considering secular evidence that is relevant and admissible under governing state law, merely because the litigants are religious parties?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED This lawsuit between two independent congregations concerns ownership of Touro Synagogue in Newport, Rhode Island, the country’s oldest and perhaps most historically significant synagogue. Petitioner Congregation Jeshuat Israel, which has prayed in Touro Synagogue for over a century, maintained that the Synagogue is held in a charitable trust for its benefit and that the congregation owns a pair of colonial-era silver bells. Respondent Congregation Shearith Israel, a separate congregation in New York City, claimed that it owns the Synagogue and bells absolutely. After a nine-day bench trial in which both parties introduced hundreds of exhibits without objection, the district court ruled in Jeshuat Israel’s favor on all issues. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Establishment Clause mandated excluding virtually all the secular evidence submitted by the parties, because that evidence might, potentially, entangle the court in religion. Ignoring that secular evidence, the Court of Appeals decided the case de novo based on only four documents—whose secular character was no different from the evidence that the Court of Appeals precluded from consideration. The questions presented are: 1. In ordinary trust and property disputes does the Establishment Clause preclude courts from considering secular evidence that is relevant and admissible under governing state law, merely because the litigants are religious parties? li QUESTIONS PRESENTED—Continued 2. In ordinary trust and property disputes does excluding secular evidence that is relevant and admissible under governing state law, merely because the litigants are religious parties, violate the Free Exercise Clause by treating religious parties differently from—and here less favorably than—secular parties? 3. In ordinary trust and property disputes may federal courts sitting in diversity disregard governing state substantive law and fashion federal common law, merely because the litigants are religious parties?