Carlos D. Villavicencio v. Julie L. Jones, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
DueProcess
Whether the prosecution (State of Florida) retained jurisdiction after the speedy trial period expired
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED Whether the prosecution (State of Florida) after Petitioner has been arrested in Dade County, Florida “Miami” and charged with two counts of F irst-Degree Murder in December 1987, and in February 1988, the State announced a “no action” dismissing the homicide charges and release Petitioner from jail on his own recognizance, but did not file an information nor ; indictment before the “no action” was announced, and approximately 2 years 10 months later December 1990, the State filed an indictment charging Petitioner with the same two homocides, ) facts, events, and circumstances, does the circuit court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and ) . for, Dade County, Florida, retain jurisdiction. Where the State filed the indictment after Petitioner’s speedy trial time of 175 days pursuant to 3.191(a), Florida Rules Criminal Procedure had expired approximately 6 or 7 terms of the speedy trial time? Petitioner says no! and states infra: : ARGUMENT Petitioner Contends The Trial Court Was Divested Of Jurisdiction After The Speedy Trial Period Had Expired Pursuant To Rule , 3.191(a), Florida R. Crim. P. (1987). In December 1987, In Dade County, Florida The Petitioner was arrested and charged . with two counts of first-degree murder in February 1988, Prior to the filing of information or an indictment. The State announced a “No Action” and Petitioner was released on his own . recognizance, approximately two years and ten months later, in December 1990, the Petitioner was rearrested based upon the same charges and conduct of the initial arrest, at which time the speedy trial time has expired approximately seven times, in violation of Florida Rule Criminal a . 7 Procedure 3.191 (a), in which petitioner was available for trial. There had been no continuances and petitioner did not contribute to any delays, which by Rules 3.191 (a), Petitioner was “as a matter of law” entitled to be discharged where no fault of Petitioner’s was contributed to the speedy trial delays. Rule 3.191(a), Provides that the intent and effect of this rule shall not be avoided by the State by entering a Nolle Prosequi to a crime charged and by prosecuting a new crime grounded on the same conduct or criminal episode. Although the state announced a “no action” in the case at bar, a no action is defined as a dismissal of pending charges before an information or indictment has been filed. State v. Clifton, 895 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5" DCA 2005 ) (Holding that a : no action and a Nolle Prosequi both signify that the state intends to terminate the prosecution and proceeded no further) because the speedy trial time is triggered at the point of arrest, as a matter of law the state may not refile charges based on the same conduct after the speedy trial time has expired, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdictions and entitling Petitioner to discharge. : State v. Williams, 791 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 2001) (The Florida Supreme Court holding that the speedy trial begins to run when an accused is arrested and continue to run even if the state does not act until after the expiration of that speedy trial period. The state may not file charges based on the same conduct after the speedy trial period has expired). See also, State v. I iminez, 44 So. 3d 1230 (Fla. 5" DCA 2010) ( Holding that this time period is not tolled by the State filing a nolle prosequi, no action, or simply taking no action after taking the defendant is taken into custody. Thus, once a defendant is taken into custody, the State must file its charging document within the speedy trial time period. Failure to do so precludes the State from prosecuting the defendant and entitles the defendant to immediate discharge) C.F. Lewis v. State, 357 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1978) 3 . ws 4 7 . In the case of Accord Allied Fidelity Insurance Co. v. State, 408 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 3 . ; DCA 1982). held that a “no action” has the same effect as nolle prosequi for purposes of releasing surety form obligation to produce th