Are the state-law periods of limitation for Alabama wrongful-death and medical-malpractice claims immune from the tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367?

QUESTION PRESENTED Are the state-law periods of limitation for Alabama wrongful-death and medical-malpractice claims immune from the tolling provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1367? Does Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018), apply to all state-law limitations provisions or are limitations periods wrongful death and in medical malpractice cases not tolled? Does American English lexicon include terms other than “toll,” “stay,” “suspend,” “stop the clock,” or “call a halt” that this Court might use to more clearly explain the operation of 28 U.S.C. § 1367? When a federal-question action that contains pendant state-law claims is filed in the district court such that the district court possesses supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 tolls the limitations period for the state-law claims. This was recently restated with absolute clarity in Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S.Ct. 594 (2018). In the instant matter, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed a trial court’s judgments that petitioner Rebekah Cooper’s claims against Ehtsham Haq M.D., Amjad Javaid M.D., and Amjad Javaid L.L.C. (Dr. Javaid’s company) were barred by Alabama’s two-year statute of limitations applicable to wrongful-death, medical-malpractice actions. The question presented is whether the Supreme Court of Alabama committed reversible error when it affirmed the trial court’s judgment that Ms. Cooper’s i claims against Dr. Haq, Dr. Javaid, and Dr. Javaid’s company were not tolled by 28 U.S.C. § 1367. ii