Guy Boudreaux, Jr. v. Timothy Hooper, Warden
HabeasCorpus
Is our system of justice truly just when it requires an attorney to attend six years of college prior to being permitted to practice law, but requires an uneducated man, who can not read nor write, to learn everything and practice law in a pro se manner in one year?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED Is our system of justice truly just when it requires an attorney to attend six years of college prior to being permitted to practice law, but requires an uneducated man, who can not read nor write, to learn everything and practice law in a pro se manner in one year? Are pro se litigants denied access to the justice system where a prisoner's right of access to the courts remain somewhat obscure since this Honorable Supreme Court has not extended this right to encompass more than the ability of an inmate to prepare and transmit a necessary legal document to a court. Brewer v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d at 821; Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, 116 S. Ct. at 2179-81; Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d at 290; Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d_1322, 1329 (5th Cir.1996). Isn't this the same right given by the United States Postal Service? When a defendant is charged with a sex offense and hires an attorney to assist him, why are these attorneys not held accountable by the courts for not following the laws, rules and/or procedures when their client becomes procedurally barred due directly to their actions? (See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 182 L. Ed. 2d 272, and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 185 L. Ed. 2D 1044) Does a procedural error made by an untrained pro se litigant who is ignorant of the law supersede the unquestionable violations of his rights as numerated by the United States Constitution and referenced by over 100 submitted legal authorities? In the same vein of offenders committed to a life sentence of incarceration is a petitioner convicted of a sex crime offense who is or may be a party to life long offender registration given more leeway when having navigating the stringent rules relegating timelessness of various applications for post-conviction relief (including Habeas Corpus under 28 USC § 2254 and state post-conviction regulations), especially if the applicant is a pro se litigant? And specifically concerning the Circuit Court's ruling on my Rule 60(b) motion, does an incarcerated petitioner, in accordance with 28 USC § 636 (b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (b), have 14 days to file objections to _a United States Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation from the date that the report was signed by the Magistrate Judge or 14 days from the receipt of that report when considering the processes of a prison's legal mail system? : 2