John J. Koresko v. R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary of Labor
Arbitration ERISA Securities JusticiabilityDoctri
Does the Secretary of Labor have standing to sue for 'losses' to the surplus of an ERISA defined benefit welfare plan without showing concrete harm to the present property interests of participants or beneficiaries?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) allows a participant, beneficiary or the Secretary of Labor to sue for appropriate relief under § 1109; or each can seek injunction or “appropriate equitable relief’ under § 1132(a)(8) or §1132(a)(5). Under § 1109, a fiduciary who breaches his duty is “personally liable to make good to such plan any | losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits * * *.” Nevertheless, participants and beneficiaries have no standing to sue for any monetary relief attributable to “plan injury” when reduction of surplus assets does not reduce their defined benefits. Because plans, like trusts, cannot sue under ; § 1132(a), and Congress did not give plans any property rights, the questions address the appropriate analytical framework for determining the Secretary’s standing to maintain an action seeking monetary recovery under ERISA: 1. Does the Secretary of Labor have standing to sue for “losses” to the surplus of an ERISA defined benefit welfare plan —i.e., a theoretical injury to a legal abstraction -under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) or (a)(5), without also showing concrete harm to the present property interests of participants or beneficiaries? 2. Whether the Third Circuit correctly held—in conflict with this Court — that 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) and (a)(5) authorized the courts to ignore contractual language, supersede the interpretation by the person’ with and trustee powers, and refuse to recognize his right to amend welfare benefit plans and deprive the Secretary of standing? 3. Did the District Court’s order to permanently bar Petitioner from providing services to any employee benefit plan exceed the limited “appropriate relief’ permitted by 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(2) and (5), especially when Congress only barred felons from positions in ERISA plans in 29 U.S.C. § 1, and the court otherwise granted a complete and adequate remedy at law?