Whether the State of Florida can deny Hurst relief and execute a prisoner because his case became final before June 24, 2002

QUESTION PRESENTED Perry Alexander Taylor was denied relief under Hurst v. Florida, 136 8. Ct. 616 (2016) in the State of Florida because his case was one of many that became final before June 24, 2002. The advisory panel who recommended death for Mr. Taylor did so by a non-unanimous vote of 8-4. There is no question that the Hurst errors were harmful in this case. Even the courts of the State of Florida agree that the errors were presumptively harmful based on the non-unanimous. advisory panel recommendations. This case presents a question of partial and fractured retroactivity in death penalty cases, and whether the remaining decisions denying Hurst relief violate the Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection laws. Following this Court’s decision in Hurst, Florida has given relief to virtually all post-Ring cases with non-unanimous death recommendations. But Florida courts have denied relief in all cases like this one that became final before June 24, 2002. This is unfair. In all of these cases, the defendants were denied the right to a trial by jury on the elements which would support the imposition of a death sentence. It’s not as if the capital system in the State of Florida gave more protections to defendants prior to June 24, 2002. As a matter of fact, defendants had less protections in the older cases. Evolving advancements in capital trial practices and industry standards in capital representation are such that the representation was better in the newer cases rather than the older cases. Florida has unconstitutionally left intact the oldest of the oldest death sentences, not the worst of the worst offenders. Cases in Florida i are now judged simply by their old age rather than by their weighty aggravation. This has led to very arbitrary and capricious results in Florida’s post-Hurst landscape. There is yet another reason why a death sentence is inappropriate and unconstitutional in this case. This case also presents a question regarding the reliability of the conviction for first degree murder in light of the flawed scientific testimony from a medical examiner regarding the likelihood that a sexual battery occurred in this case. Based on a relatively recent affidavit from the medical examiner in this case clarifying some statistics and probabilities of what likely occurred or did not occur during this murder, the sexual battery component of this case is called into question. As such, this case can be more correctly described as a rage murder (heat of passion type-murder) rather than a rape murder. Therefore life is the highest legally justifiable sentence remaining for this offense, not death. The advisory panel who recommended death by 8-4 did so without hearing the medical examiner correct his flawed testimony regarding the cause of the vaginal injuries in this case. Mr. Taylor requests that certiorari be granted to address the following three substantial questions: 1. Consistent with Equal Protection and the Eighth Amendment, can the State of Florida deny Hurst relief and execute a prisoner because his case became before June 24, 2002? ii 2. Should Hurst be applied retroactively in the State of Florida at least to this Court’s decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) in light of the evolving standards of decency, Equal Protection, and the Highth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment where the advisory panel at the penalty phase was repeatedly instructed in violation of Caldwell? 3. Whether the State of Florida execute a prisoner after the state’s medical examiner corrected his flawed trial testimony via sworn affidavit, thus creating reasonable doubt for first degree murder?