Whether the continued incarceration of a state prisoner who has presented a truly persuasive case of actual innocence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioner Kenneth G. Middleton is a Missouri prisoner serving a sentence of life without parole after being convicted of first degree murder involving the shooting death of his wife. Petitioner was convicted solely on the basis of circumstantial evidence and has steadfastly contended since he was initially arrested in 1990 that the death of his wife was an accident. Both his trial and postconviction counsel were demonstrably ineffective, a fact that has never been disputed by respondent. Petitioner was represented at trial and on consolidated appeal by Robert G. Duncan, who failed to conduct any investigation or call any witnesses at trial on petitioner’s behalf. Mr. Duncan subsequently lost his law license during petitioner’s direct appeal. Jn Re Duncan, 844 S.W.2d 443 (Mo. banc 1992). Petitioner’s first state post-conviction motion court counsel, Gerald Handley, also demonstrated a shocking lack of diligence and professionalism. As a result, petitioner’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on consolidated appeal and his subsequent federal habeas corpus proceedings were doomed to failure because his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were procedurally barred due to Mr. Handley’s incompetence. State v. Middleton, 854 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. App. W.D. 1993). In 2003, petitioner filed a motion to reopen his initial state post-conviction action alleging he was abandoned by his post-conviction counsel. After conducting extensive evidentiary hearings, Judge Edith Messina, who was also the trial judge, granted petitioner post-conviction relief, finding that his claims of abandonment of post-conviction counsel and his underlying claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel were sufficiently compelling to warrant a new trial. The Missouri Court of Appeals, after conducting de novo review, reversed Judge Messina’s decision on state procedural grounds, finding that the 29.15 motion court had no jurisdiction to reopen the case. Middleton v. State, 200 S.W.3d 140 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006). (“Middleton IP’). In 2010, petitioner filed a second motion before the trial court to reopen his Rule 29.15 motion due to the abandonment and ineffectiveness of his state postconviction counsel in light of intervening caselaw from the Missouri Supreme Court expanding upon the possible scenarios where abandonment of counsel occurs and this Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). Judge Messina denied this motion to reopen primarily because of the Court of Appeals’ previous reversal of her 2005 decision to reopen the case and grant petitioner a new trial. The Missouri Court of Appeals, after reviewing Judge Messina’s decision under the clearly erroneous standard of review set forth under Mo. S. Ct. Rule 29.15(k), affirmed Judge Messina’s judgment. Petitioner commenced the present post-conviction action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to Mo. S. Ct. Rule 91, in the Circuit Court of DeKalb County Missouri. This petition, apart from raising ineffectiveness of trial and post-conviction counsel claims addressed by Judge Messina in 2004, also raised a free-standing claim of actual innocence that was not cognizable in his prior Rule 29.15 proceedings. This petition was summarily denied on August 7, 2017. Petitioner refiled the same petition in the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District. This petition was summarily denied by the Court of Appeals on November 8, 2017. Petitioner, thereafter, filed the same petition in the Missouri Supreme Court. The Missouri Supreme Court denied this petition on August 21, 2018. Based on the foregoing facts, this case presents the following questions: 1. Whether the continued incarceration of a state prisoner who has presented a truly persuasive case of actual innocence violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2. Whether the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that state prisoners be afforded a full and fair corrective proce