What amount of force satisfies the definition of 'physical force' under Johnson v. United States?

Questions Presented For Review Rojas pleaded guilty to one count of interference with interstate commerce by robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and one count of using or carrying a firearm during a “crime of violence” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii). He filed a motion to correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in which he argued that after Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), his § 924(c) conviction for using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence is no longer enforceable. The district court denied his motion and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Rojas presents the following issues to this Court: I. What amount of force satisfies this Court’s definition of “physical force,” that is, force capable of causing physical pain or injury to another person as described in Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010)? II. When threatening to devalue another’s intangible assets constitutes Hobbs Act robbery but does not require violent force, is the Tenth Circuit’s decision that an element of such robbery is the use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent force that qualifies it as a ‘crime of violence’ under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) in conflict with the express language of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and the law in its own and other circuits’ pattern jury instructions, which allow a conviction for merely threatening harm in the future? i