No. 18-6956

Jason Dirk Walton v. Florida, et al.

Lower Court: Florida
Docketed: 2018-12-07
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
IFP
Tags: capital-murder criminal-law due-process eighth-amendment first-degree-murder jury-unanimity resentencing retrospective-application retrospective-law sentencing-elements substantive-criminal-law
Key Terms:
AdministrativeLaw DueProcess Punishment
Latest Conference: 2019-02-15
Question Presented (AI Summary)

When changes in a state's substantive criminal law apply retrospectively to cases involving homicides committed in 1981 and 1982, but not to cases involving homicides committed in 1983, does this violate the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED--CAPITAL CASE Questions 1. When changes in a state’s substantive criminal set out the elements of capital murder which the prosecution must prove to the satisfaction of a unanimous jury before death is a possible sentence, does it violates the Due Process Clause to have that substantive criminal law apply retrospectively to cases in which the homicides were committed in 1981 and 1982, while not applying the new substantive law to a case in which the homicides were committed in 1983. Under the Due Process Clause can a conviction of capital murder be required in cases involving 1981 and 1982 homicides before death is a permissible sentence, while death sentences for convictions of the lesser offense of first degree murder for homicides committed in 1983 remain intact? 2. When changes in a state’s substantive criminal set out the elements of capital murder which the prosecution must prove to the satisfaction of a unanimous jury before death is a possible sentence, does it violates the Eighth Amendment to have that substantive criminal law apply retrospectively to cases in which the homicides were committed in 1981 and 1982, while not applying the new substantive law to a case in which homicides were committed in 1983. Under the Eighth Amendment can a conviction of capital murder be required in cases involving 1981 and 1982 homicides before death is a permissible sentence, while death sentences for convictions of the lesser offense of i first degree murder for homicides committed in 1983 remain intact? 3. When State law provides that a death sentence may be vacated and a resentencing ordered when new evidence would probably result in a less severe sentence at a resentencing, does it violate the Eighth Amendment to ignore changes in law that require juror unanimity, instead of a majority vote, as to the elements of capital murder, which were not previously regarded as elements, from consideration of the probable outcome at a resentencing? ai

Docket Entries

2019-02-19
Petition DENIED.
2019-02-11
Reply of petitioner Jason Walton filed. (Distributed)
2019-01-17
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 2/15/2019.
2019-01-03
Brief of respondent State of Florida in opposition filed.
2018-12-03
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due January 7, 2019)
2018-10-01
Application (18A324) granted by Justice Thomas extending the time to file until December 2, 2018.
2018-09-24
Application (18A324) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from October 3, 2018 to December 2, 2018, submitted to Justice Thomas.

Attorneys

Jason Walton
Martin J. McClain — Petitioner
State of Florida
Carolyn M. SnurkowskiOffice of the Attorney General, Respondent