Has United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2005), and its progeny stripped the Courts of Appeal of the ability to meaningfully supervise the plea colloquy process?

Question Presented Petitioner Kenneth Harper’s (“Harper”) change-of-plea hearing was brimming with error. As the government conceded below, and as Second Circuit concluded, the district court erred by failing to advise Harper of his rights to a jury trial; against compelled self-incrimination: to testify and present evidence; and to compel the attendance of witnesses at trial. The district court also failed to advise Harper of his right to plead not guilty: of possible forfeiture and restitution obligations; of the court’s obligation to consider the Sentencing Guidelines range and the sentencing factors identified by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and of possible immigration consequences of conviction. An exasperated Second Circuit was unable to vacate defendant’s convictions, however, because neither the defense attorney nor the prosecutor objected to the omissions at the time, and defendant failed to demonstrate that but for the errors, he would not have pleaded guilty. The question this case presents is: Has United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55 (2005), and its progeny stripped the Courts of Appeal of the ability to meaningfully supervise the plea colloquy process?