No. 18-7102

Curtis D. Huling v. United States

Lower Court: Eleventh Circuit
Docketed: 2018-12-19
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP Experienced Counsel
Tags: aggravated-assault controlled-substance-offense crime-of-violence mens-rea mental-state physical-force recklessness sentencing-guidelines sentencing-guidelines-4b1.1 voisine-v-united-states
Key Terms:
Environmental SocialSecurity Securities Immigration LaborRelations
Latest Conference: 2019-02-15
Question Presented (AI Summary)

What is the least culpable mental state that qualifies a state aggravated assault offense as generic?

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Section 4B1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines raises the offense level for a “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense” committed by an offender with two prior convictions of a “crime of violence” or a “controlled substance offense.” Section 4B1.2(a)(2), lists “aggravated assault” as a “crime of violence.” For a state offense to qualify as “aggravated assault,” it must be punishable by over a year and have elements that are the same as or narrower than “generic” aggravated assault. Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (11th Cir. 2013). Additionally, under § 4B1.2(a)(1), any offense punishable by over a year that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another[]” is a crime of violence. This petition asks, first, what is the least culpable mental state that qualifies a state aggravated assault offense as generic: “knowledge, purpose, or intent,” as the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Garcia-Jimenez, 807 F. 3d 1079, 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), “extreme indifference recklessness,” as the Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have held, see United States v. BarcenasYanez, 826 F. 3d 752 (4th Cir. 2016); United States v. McFalls, 592 F. 3d 707, 717 (6th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Voisine v. United States, __ U.S.__, 186 S. Ct. 2272 (2016); United States v. Schneider, 905 F.3d 1088 (8th Cir. 2018), “ordinary recklessness,” as the Fifth Circuit held in United States v. Mungia-Portillo, 484 F. 3d 813 (5th Cir. 2007), or the general intent to commit an act without a particular mens rea as to its consequences, as the Eleventh Circuit held below. Second, this petition asks whether the “use of physical force” under § 4B1.2 (a)(1) encompasses crimes of recklessness, like the analogous clause this Court considered in Voisine, 136 S. Ct. 2272, or if it excludes such crimes, like the pure accidents that this Court found not to qualify as a “use of physical force against the person or property of another’ in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). 1

Docket Entries

2019-02-19
Petition DENIED.
2019-01-17
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 2/15/2019.
2019-01-09
Waiver of right of respondent United States of America to respond filed.
2018-12-07
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due January 18, 2019)
2018-10-05
Application (18A349) granted by Justice Thomas extending the time to file until December 7, 2018.
2018-09-28
Application (18A349) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from October 8, 2018 to December 7, 2018, submitted to Justice Thomas.

Attorneys

Curtis Huling
Jonathan DodsonFederal Defenders of the Middle District of Georgia, Inc., Petitioner
Jonathan DodsonFederal Defenders of the Middle District of Georgia, Inc., Petitioner
United States of America
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent