Whether second-degree murder in Florida is a 'violent felony' within the meaning of the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)

QUESTION PRESENTED At issue in this matter is whether second-degree murder in Florida! is a “violent felony” within the meaning of the elements clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (the ACCA). Asked differently,” this case posits the question as to whether this Court’s definition of “physical force” in Curtis Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265 (2010), requires the deployment of destructive or violent force as distinguished from causing bodily injury through indirect means. l Particular to this case is the version of second-degree murder found at Florida Statutes § 782.04(2) (1992). 2 Should this Court hold this case pending this Court’s resolution of a similar question in Denard Stokeling v. United States, No. 17-5554 (petition for cert. granted, and argued Oct. 9, 2018). 3 See, e.g., the petition for a writ of certiorari filed in Edwin Deshazior v. United States, No. 17-8766 (May 1, 2018) (asking “[w]hether an offense that may be committed through an indirect, non-violent application of force — such as the use of poison — has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force for purposes of the ACCA”); see also Stokeling v. United States, No. 17-5554 (argued Oct. 9, 2018) (deciding whether Florida’s robbery offense includes as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against a person to categorically qualify as a “violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)). i