Whether the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit erroneously affirmed Mr. Patmon's sentence under USSG § 2K2.1 based on its determination that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2) is a 'crime of violence' under the enumerated offenses clause of the Sentencing Guidelines

question presented by this case is whether the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit erroneously affirmed Mr. Patmon’s sentence under USSG § 2K2.1 based on its determination that Georgia aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2) is a “crime of violence” under the enumerated offenses clause of the Sentencing Guidelines. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit cited to its prior precedent in United States v. Morales-Alonso, 878 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2018), rejecting the argument that the Georgia statutory definition of “deadly weapon” could be overbroad based on the plain language of the statute and a proffered hypothetical instead of a specific state case. Thus, this case presents the following broad question: () Under Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 189 (2007), must a defendant always identify a state case to establish the least culpable conduct criminalized by a statute, or can the plain language of the statute itself establish the statute’s breadth? i