Whether federal carjacking by way of intimidation is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(8)(A)'s force clause

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Petitioner Carl Lee Williams pleaded guilty to (1) federal carjacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119 and (2) unlawfully brandishing a firearm during the commission of a “crime of violence” (in relation to the federal carjacking conviction) in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Mr. Williams later filed a motion to vacate his brandishing sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that, in light of United States v. Johnson, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015) (“Samuel Johnson’), his § 924(c) conviction was longer enforceable. The district court denied his motion and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that decision. Petitioner Williams now presents the following questions: 1. Is federal carjacking by way of intimidation a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(8)(A)’s force clause? 2. In light of this Court’s recent decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018) (finding that 18 U.S.C. § 16’s residual clause could only be applied and interpreted using the “categorical approach” and that the clause was therefore unconstitutionally vague), is 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B)’s identically-worded residual clause also unconstitutional? -ii