Michael Alexander Bacon v. United States
SocialSecurity Securities Immigration
What evidentiary inquiry is required when the government responds to a post-conviction motion under Rule 41(g) by asserting that it lacks physical possession of the seized property?
QUESTION PRESENTED Courts widely recognize the general rule that seized property, other than contraband, should be returned to its rightful owner once criminal proceedings have ended. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) provides a mechanism whereby “a person agerieved...by the deprivation of property may move for the property’s return.” Rule 41(g) states that the district court “must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion.” This case raises the question of what evidentiary inquiry is required when the government responds to a post-conviction motion under Rule 41(g) by asserting that it lacks physical possession of the seized property. May a district court dispense with the evidentiary inquiry required under Rule 41(g) if the government says it does not have physical possession of the seized property, as the Tenth Circuit allows, or must the district court first receive evidence and resolve factual disputes to determine what happened to property requested under Rule 41(g) but never returned, as the plain language of the Rule requires and the federal circuit courts uniformly hold? i