Did the Supreme Court of Virginia err in finding that the Circuit Court of Henrico did not commit reversible error

QUESTIONS PRESENTED I. Did the Supreme Court of Virginia err in finding that the Circuit Court of Henrico did not commit reversible error by continuously granting the Attorney General of Virginia multiple extensions to respond to petitioner's motion adding up to a total of 199 days when this is in direct violation of Rules 55(a), 3:19 Default Judgment, of the Supreme Court of Virginia which parallels Rules12, 12(a) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Review Gaglio v. Silverman, 330 BR 40(2005 SD. NY.), Federalist NO.78, and the Attorney General was clearly in violation of the rules prohibiting ex parte communication as cited in Judicial Inquiry and Review Comm'n v. Shull, 274 Va. 657, 669-70, 651 S.E.2d 648, 655 (2007) when the Lower _ Court "made arrangements" with the Attorney General without informing Arrington, see: U.S. v. McDonnell, 792 F.3d 478 (C.A.4 (Va.) 2015) citing United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1318-19 (7th Cir.1987) which in turn violated petitioner's right to due process of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. II. Did the Supreme Court of Virginia err in finding that the Circuit Court of Henrico did not commit reversible error by determining that petitioner's Motion to Vacate was untimely under Rule 1:1 of the Supreme Court of Virginia holding that at the expiration of 21 days of the judgment, the court rendering the judgment loses Jurisdiction of the case, and that only fraud or a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can render a judgment void, when the adoption of an unlawful mode of procedure that's allowed by Virginia Code §19.2-221, can also render a judgment void as held Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 23 L.Ed. 914 (1876) in violation of the petitioner's right to due process of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution due to the use of a short form indictment which omitted the element of malice aforethought as described in Virginia Code §18.2-32 for the charge of First Degree Murder. . Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 (c) (1) HI. Did the Supreme Court of Virginia err in finding that the Circuit Court Henrico did not commit reversible error when it determined that Petitioners convictions for murder, carnal knowledge, forgery and uttering, larceny, and credit card fraud and theft which were procured through the "fraudulent pre-trial statements of Jeremy Harrison, and Tanya Vincent" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process as held in Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), should not be vacated because they are claims of intrinsic fraud which could have been raised at trial or on appeal. | IV. Did the Supreme Court of Virginia err in finding that the Circuit Court of Henrico did not commit reversible error when it determined that Petitioner's claim that his trial attorney committed various frauds in violation of US. V. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (U.S. Cal. 1878), are merely claims of ineffective . assistance, which could have timely been raised in a petition for writ of habeas , corpus. . a 24 , : . ; : i. :