Whether under the Fourth Amendment the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary to extend a traffic stop must be formed before the officer's deviation from the stop's original mission?

QUESTION PRESENTED Under this Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions, an officer is prohibited from prolonging a traffic stop beyond its original purpose without “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity. See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); Rodriguez v. U.S., 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015). But the Court has not clearly defined what constitutes such “reasonable suspicion” or when such suspicion must be formed. As a result, state courts of last resort as well as federal circuit courts have created different standards and are now split over when an officer must form a reasonable suspicion. The question presented is: Whether under the Fourth Amendment the reasonable articulable suspicion necessary to extend a traffic stop must be formed before the officer’s deviation from the stop’s original mission?