DueProcess HabeasCorpus Punishment Privacy
Whether McCoy applies when a defendant's attorneys concede, against his wishes, his guilt to a lesser-included offense during final argument, and is a timely and express statement of his wishes to present an innocence defense sufficient to invoke McCoy?
QUESTIONS PRESENTED This Court held in McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1508 (2018) that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to choose “the objective of his defense and to insist that his counsel refrain from admitting guilt, even when counsel’s experienced-based view is that confessing guilt offers the defendant the best chance to avoid the death penalty.” That is exactly what happened in Mr. King’s case. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”), in a five-to-four split decision, summarily dismissed Mr. King’s “application as an abuse of the writ without reviewing the merits of the [McCoy] claim raised.” Ex parte John William King, No. WR-49,391-03 (Tex. Crim. App. April 22, 2019) (per curiam) at *3. Four judges dissented, holding that “[a] death-sentenced who has asserted his innocence since his capital-murder trial” deserves both a stay of execution and time for the TCCA to “decide this issue unhurriedly.” Jd., Keasler, J. dissenting, joined by Hervey, Richardson and Walker, JJ. at *2. In the wake of McCoy at least two questions have already emerged, and will continue to emerge, in the courts called on to apply that case. The first is the scope of McCoy, the manner in which a defendant must have objected to trial counsel’s decision to forego a defense, the timing of that objection, and McCoy’s applicability when trial counsel concedes a defendant’s guilt to a lesser-included offense. Yet another question is the retroactive application of McCoy, as one of the concurring opinions raised the question of McCoy’s nonretroactivity in light of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) Id., Yeary, J., concurring. The conflicting answers courts have given in post-McCoy decisions and the clear request for guidance in the TCCA’s split decision in this case call for this Court to clarify, and give rise, to the following questions presented: 1. Whether McCoy applies when a defendant’s attorneys concede, against his wishes, his guilt to a lesser-included offense during final argument, and is a timely and express statement of his wishes to present an innocence defense sufficient to invoke McCoy? 2. Assuming, arguendo, that McCoy announces a “new rule” within the meaning of Teague, and also assuming, arguendo, that the TCCA’s application of Teague is an adequate and independent state bar to preclude federal review of the merits of a claim, does the “new rule” this Court announced in McCoy constitute a “watershed rule of criminal procedure,” such that it satisfies the second exception to Teague, which generally bars retroactive applications of new rules of criminal procedure to cases on collateral review? -ii