Should the doctrine of equitable tolling be expanded to include a pro se party's mistaken belief about filing deadlines

QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Should the doctrine of equitable tolling be expanded to include a situation in which a pro se party in federal sector employment discrimination litigation (against the U.S. Department of Defense under Title VII) believed that their complaint could be presented to the Department of Labor prior to filing in U.S. District Court even though their complaint, timely filed at the Department of Labor, would consequently be untimely filed in U.S. District Court after the expiration of the ninety day filing period? 2. Should a pro se litigant be penalized when the actions of one governmental agency effectively caused a delay in the process such that the employee unknowingly missed a filing deadline with another agency? The situation contemplated also includes the pro se party having informed both the Department of Defense and the Department of Labor of her belief, and neither agency informs the pro se party that she has filed with the incorrect agency. 3. Should a pro se litigant be penalized when the Department of Labor expends a protracted period of time determining whether it has enforcement authority and the ninety days under Title VII's right to sue expires while the Department of Labor is making its determination as to its enforcement authority? 4. Is an ADA/The Rehabilitation Act claim like or related to, and/or can it reasonably be expected to : grow out of a charge that the denial of an employee’s ii request for FMLA leave is discriminatory and retaliatory such that the failure to specifically mention the ADA/The Rehabilitation Act claim during the administrative process is excusable and a court errs in dismissing the ADA/The Rehabilitation Act claim based on a failure to exhaust administrative remedies? 5. A related question is whether the EEOC’s own interpretation of the ADA/The Rehabilitation Act (which supports the position that these claims are “like or related”) is entitled to deference by reviewing courts under the Chevron Deference.