Whether federal courts have authority to save a state or local law from unconstitutionality by positing a limiting construction that has no state-law basis and contradicts governing authorities' understanding of their own law

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Petitioners are sidewalk counselors who engage in quiet, one-on-one conversations with women visiting an abortion clinic in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. A painted semi-circle extends 15 feet from the clinic’s door. Under the City’s buffer-zone law, the counselors may not speak—or even pray—in this zone because the City views Petitioners’ message of hope, personal concern, and assistance as advocacy or demonstration. Yet the City allows others to speak face-to-face in the zone for nearly any other reason. Because the buffer zone burdens and disfavors the counselors’ speech, they sued. Confronting the City’s unmistakably invalid ordinance, the Third Circuit unilaterally construed the law to prohibit prayer or generic advocacy but to allow counseling. This exacerbated a 7-3 circuit split over whether federal courts have authority to limit state laws to avoid constitutional flaws. It then held the rewritten law— which Pittsburgh neither wanted nor requested— content neutral; rejected McCullen’s narrow-tailoring standard, in conflict with three circuits; and held the burden on speech insignificant or de minimis. After litigating five years, the result is an advisory opinion that neither binds state courts nor prohibits City officials from prosecuting Petitioners in the future, even for counseling. The questions presented are: 1. Whether federal courts have authority to save a state or local law from unconstitutionality by positing a limiting construction that has no state-law basis and contradicts governing authorities’ understanding of their own law. 2. Whether Pittsburgh’s buffer-zone ordinance violates the Free Speech Clause.