Whether the analysis applied by the Fifth Circuit as articulated in the Pre-Young decision of Brady vs. Office of the Sergeant at Arms 820 F.2d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008) alters the new framework for analyzing claims set forth in Young thereby modifying its holding

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The two questions presented are: 1. Whether the analysis applied by the Fifth Circuit as articulated in the Pre-Young decision of Brady vs. Office of the Sergeant at Arms 820 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008) which recommends that (courts focus on the pretext stage if the employer has identified a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action) alters the new framework for analyzing claims set forth in Young thereby modifying its holding. 2. Whether who or what constitutes a comparator in the prima facie stage to determine discriminatory animus based upon Congress’ language in 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(K) as articulated in McDonnell Douglas and further defined in Young when referring to “***(as other persons not so affected but similar in the ability or inability to work.” More specifically can a pregnant complainant be defined as a comparator to herself to show that her employer’s reason for an adverse employment action was pretextual as pronounced in of Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 132 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 1987). The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana dismissing Plaintiff’s claim asserted u under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”) as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). The District Court granted Employer’s summary judgment holding Plaintiff; hereinafter referred to as Luke, had not established a prima facie case of discrimination under the new standards enunciated in Young vs. United Parcel Services, Inc. 135 S.Ct. 1338 (2015). The Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion on January 14, 2019, bypassed the issue regarding whether the District Court had altered the Court’s prima facie standard enunciated in Young, and affirmed summary judgment on behalf of the employer on the premise that Luke had not contradicted her employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment , more specifically that she was not able to perform an essential aspect of her job due toa weight lifting restriction. Luke vs. CPlace Forest Park SNF, No. 16-30992 (5 Cir. Jan. 14, 2019) (unpublished) (“Slip op.”) at 3-4. The Fifth Circuit’s decision contradicts the new framework set forth regarding claims as set forth in Young. The Fifth Circuit altered the new standard thereby changing the circumstantial evidence framework thus contradicting the Court’s holding in Young. Further the four prong standard based upon the analysis of McDonnell Douglas in determining whether an accommodation shall be granted to pregnant women as required under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”) has caused a split between the Fifth and Eighth Circuits; more specifically, as it pertains to and related to ***(as other persons not so affected but similar in the ability or inability to work.” as codified under 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e(K). Issue has arisen regarding interpretation of the type and use of evidence as it pertains to “other”. More specifically what and who constitutes comparator evidence pertaining to the identification of an employee “similar in the ability or inability to work”. The Fifth Circuit’s opinion contradicts the Eighth Circuit’s decision pronounced in Deneen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 1382 F.3d 431 (8th Cir. 1987) that held a pregnant woman can be seen as a comparator to herself.