No. 19-318

Francis A. Bottini, Jr., et al. v. City of San Diego, California, et al.

Lower Court: California
Docketed: 2019-09-09
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Amici (2)Response Waived Experienced Counsel
Tags: due-process first-english first-english-precedent investment-backed-expectations penn-central penn-central-test property-rights regulatory-taking regulatory-takings single-family-housing takings takings-clause temporary-takings
Key Terms:
AdministrativeLaw DueProcess Takings
Latest Conference: 2019-11-01
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Should the investment-backed-expectations test of Penn Central be construed to totally bar recovery whenever the purchaser of a single-family lot is unable to learn, at the time of purchase, the exact path of allowable development under local law?

Question Presented (from Petition)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, this Court held that the Takings Clause requires the government to compensate a landowner for the entire period when a regulatory taking effectively denied him “all use of his property.” See 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987). And in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, the Court formulated a three-prong, ad hoc test for regulatory takings that requires consideration of whether the landowner had “reasonable and distinct investmentbacked expectations” to justify compensation. See 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Here, the landowners have endured an eight-year ordeal to apply for a permit from a city government to build a home on a lot zoned solely for single-family housing. After concluding that the city’s denial of the building permit was unlawful, the California trial and appellate courts refused to find a_ taking notwithstanding the clear mandate in First English and Penn Central. And the California Supreme Court rescinded its initial grant of review. The questions presented in this petition are two-fold: 1. Should the test of Penn Central be construed to totally bar recovery whenever the purchaser of a single-family lot is unable to learn, at the time of purchase, the exact path of allowable development under local law? 2. Should the “normal delay” exception to the total temporary takings rule of First English be construed so broadly as to allow for indefinite and calculated delays to bar recovery of any compensation?

Docket Entries

2019-11-04
Petition DENIED.
2019-10-16
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/1/2019.
2019-10-09
Waiver of right of respondent City of San Diego, et al. to respond filed.
2019-10-08
Brief amicus curiae of Washington Legal Foundation filed.
2019-10-04
Brief amicus curiae of The Cato Institute filed.
2019-09-05
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due October 9, 2019)
2019-08-07
Application (19A1) granted by Justice Kagan extending the time to file until September 5, 2019.
2019-08-02
Application (19A1) to extend further the time from August 8, 2019 to September 5, 2019, submitted to Justice Kagan.
2019-06-28
Application (19A1) granted by Justice Kagan extending the time to file until August 8, 2019.
2019-06-25
Application (19A1) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from July 9, 2019 to August 8, 2019, submitted to Justice Kagan.

Attorneys

City of San Diego, et al.
Jana Mickova WillOffice the San Diego City Attorney, Respondent
Jana Mickova WillOffice the San Diego City Attorney, Respondent
Nina M. Bottini, et al.
Richard A. Epstein — Petitioner
Richard A. Epstein — Petitioner
The Cato Institute
Ilya ShapiroCato Institute, Amicus
Ilya ShapiroCato Institute, Amicus
Washington Legal Foundation
Corbin Knight BartholdWashington Legal Foundation, Amicus
Corbin Knight BartholdWashington Legal Foundation, Amicus