No. 19-483

Elsie Marino v. Jeffrey Nadel, dba Law Offices of Jeffrey Nadel, et al.

Lower Court: Fourth Circuit
Docketed: 2019-10-11
Status: Denied
Type: Paid
Tags: creditor debt-assignment debt-collection fair-debt-collection fair-debt-collection-practices-act foreclosure foreclosure-action postjudgment-remedy standing statutory-interpretation trustee trustee-status
Key Terms:
Privacy JusticiabilityDoctri
Latest Conference: 2019-12-13
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether a trustee that receives assignment or transfer of a debt, as trustee for beneficial interest holders solely to bring a foreclosure action, can qualify as a person facilitating collection 'for another' within the defined exclusion to the term 'creditor' in § 1692a(4)

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED In Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, 296, the Court observed that an apparent objective of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., is preserving creditors’ judicial remedies, “but the term [‘creditor’] does not include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another.” § 1692a(4). Congress distinguishes and includes debts either owed or due another, § 1692a(6). Respondent Bank Of New York Mellon, As Trustee For CIT Mortgage Loan Trust 2007-1, is a self-proclaimed trustee. The first question is whether a trustee such as respondent that receives assignment or transfer of a debt, as trustee for beneficial interest holders solely to bring a foreclosure action, can qualify as a person facilitating collection “for another” within the defined exclusion to the term “creditor” in § 1692a(4). The second question is whether the lower court’s rule that “the filing of an action to foreclose is a necessary precedent to reaching a postjudgment judicial remedy, so communications with a court that are necessary to maintain that foreclosure action do not violate §1692c(b)” renders §1692i(b) and § 1692c(b)’s exception “or as reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy,” and particularly the word “postjudgment” superfluous, void, or insignificant.

Docket Entries

2019-12-16
Petition DENIED.
2019-11-26
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 12/13/2019.
2019-10-07
Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due November 12, 2019)
2019-07-31
Application (19A121) granted by The Chief Justice extending the time to file until October 10, 2019.
2019-07-25
Application (19A121) to extend the time to file a petition for a writ of certiorari from August 11, 2019 to October 10, 2019, submitted to The Chief Justice.

Attorneys

Elsie Marino
Elsie Marino — Petitioner
Elsie Marino — Petitioner