Should this lack of clarity be resolved by this Court?

Questions Presented 1. In Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 125 (1954) this Court recognized the “inherent risk” of the use of circumstantial evidence, but held that a special instruction was not required so long as certain precautions are taken. Courts and commentators have struggled with the lack of clarity concerning whether these precautions apply to all circumstantial evidence cases or only in net worth prosecutions of the type in Holland as the Court entertained both arguments, i.e. (a) that the precautions do not apply across the board, and (b) that if the rejection of the cautionary jury instruction is to be applied broadly, so are the warnings regarding the use of circumstantial evidence. Should this lack of clarity be resolved by this Court? 2. The State trial court gave the following jury instruction: “When circumstantial evidence is susceptible to two interpretations, one that supports guilt and the other that supports innocence, the jury determines which is most reasonable.” Petitioner objected, contending that the language instructing the jury to “determine[] which is most reasonable” violated federal constitutional protections because the instruction diluted the State’s burden of proof and compromised his right to be presumed innocent. When giving a circumstantial evidence instruction, most state courts require the trial court to include language that if the circumstantial evidence is “open to two reasonable constructions, one indicating guilt and the other innocence, it is your duty to accept the construction indicating innocence.” See Hampton v. State, i 961 N.E.2d 480, 491 (Ind. 2012); State v. Sanchez, 388 Mont. 262, 399 P.3d 886, 891 (2017) (McKinnon, concurring) (“In my view, the ‘most reasonable’ instruction is inconsistent with the presumption of innocence to which a defendant is entitled.”). Is the instruction in this case, which essentially instructed the jury that it could reject a reasonable interpretation of the evidence that supports innocence, unconstitutional? 3. The State trial court also gave the following jury instruction: “ Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs. Beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean beyond any doubt or beyond a shadow of a doubt.” Does this instruction, which is the subject of debate in the United States Court of Appeals— compare, e.g. Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885, 889-90 (10th Cir.1990) (unconstitutional) and Scurry v. United States, 347 F.2d 468, 470 (D.C.Cir.1965) (same) cert. denied , 389 U.S. 883 (1967) with Ramirez v. Hatcher, 136 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir.) (explicitly rejecting Monk, id. at 1214 n.11), , cert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998) and United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891 (1994); cf. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954) (disfavoring phrasing reasonable doubt even as doubt “which [people] in more serious and important affairs of [their] own lives might be willing to act upon.”)— whether by itself or in combination with the instruction in Question 2, dilute the State’s burden ii of proof and compromise Petitioner’s right to be presumed innocent? 4. A search warrant authorized the seizure of all “electronic devices,” including all computers found in the home and “the information contained therein” was both overbroad and lacked particularity and probable cause for the seizure because this was not a computer-based crime, but instead a homicide investigation. A second warrant, obtained two and one-half years after the computers were originally seized had no temporal or substantive limitations and it purportedly authorized the search and seizure of an unlimited amount of data. A forensic search conducted by the F.B.I. showed the chrome web history related to key word searches found on one of the computers and the prosecution argued that this internet search history was proof P