Whether district court's lack of religious neutrality violated Petitioner's right to the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment or Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment

question presented is, whether the government, in pursuit of legitimate interest, can in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious beliefs? Or whether the government. can regulate or outlaw conduct because it is religiously motivated. 113 S. Ct. 2217. 3. In response to Petitioner's Plea for a religious exemption from participating in Prison Work Program without pay, because slavery is contrary to the Law of God in his religion. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that because the prison , ii system required prisoners to work, then Petitioner has no viable 13th Amendment claim. In other words, the Fifth Circuit declared that the provision of the 13th Amendment overrides the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, authorized the lower courts to ignore prisoner's First Amendment claims in favor of slavery, affirmed discrimination against religious heliefs, and sanctioned Texas to impose a penalty on Free Exercise of Religion. In light of this Honorable Court's precedent that, "a law may not discriminate against some or all religious beliefs." 113 S. Ct. 2217, the question presented is whether the application of State regulation 497.099 requiring prisoners to work for no pay, discriminates against Petitioner's religious beliefs, or violates his rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution. 4. Title 28 U.S.C.A. §1915(e) and §1915A was enacted by the United States Congress to curtail the litigation of individuals proceeding in forma pauperis. The Congress did not intend for the either statute to be used to dismiss non-IFP civil right : complaints, and there is nothing in the language of the statute to suggest otherwise. Although, the district court dismissed Petitioner's non-IFP complaint pursuant tao §1915(e), the court pointed to no authority from this Court or the circuit courts authorizing it to dismiss a non-IFP civil right complaint pursuant to either §1915(e) or $81915A. Lii The Fifth Circuit on the other hand, created a question of law on this issue. The Appellate Court held: "This Court has not determined whether §1915(e)(2)(8)(i), which is included in a section titled "Proceeding in forma pauperis," applies when the plaintiff is not proseeding in forma pauperis." Notwithstanding, the Fifth Circuit endorsed the district court's decision to dismiss Petitioner's civil right complaint Pursuant to §1915(e). See Exhibit "A" @ 3, The question presented is whether the provisions of 28 U.S5.C.A. §1915(e) or §1915A applies to Petitioner's non-IFP complaint, and whether the district violated Petitioner's due process rights by dismissing his suit in which the filing fees were paid pursuant to §1915(e). 5. In Channer v. Hall, 112 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 1997), the Court held: "Our inquiry begins with United States v. Kozminski, 108 S. Ct. 2751 (1988). In that case, the Supreme Court held that, the term "involuntary servitude" necessarily means a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defen: dant by the use of threat at physical restriant or physical injury, or by the legal process." Id., @ 952, -108 S. Ct.