Whether this Court's rulings in Johnson and Welch apply to the residual clause of the career-offender provision of the former mandatory Sentencing Guidelines

QUESTION PRESENTED In Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), this Court held unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Then in Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016), this Court held that Johnson announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. And this Court has applied this same rule in invalidating the nearly identical language in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), and in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). A motion to correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is timely when filed within one year of “the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by this Court, if that right has been newly recognized by this Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(38). The question presented is: 1. Whether this Court’s rulings in Johnson and Welch, retroactively invalidating the residual clause of the ACCA because it was unconstitutionally vague, apply to an identically worded provision in a different mandatory sentencing scheme, that is, the residual clause of the career-offender provision of the former mandatory Sentencing Guidelines or does this application require recognition of a “new right”? i