Can reasonable jurists debate whether federal armed bank robbery by intimidation is not a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) because the offense fails to require any intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force?

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW Federal armed bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d), is a general intent offense. Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 268 (2000). Decades of circuit precedent hold that intimidation under the statute is judged by the reasonable reaction of the victim, rather than by the defendant’s intent. This Court has ruled that the language found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(B)’s definition of a “crime of violence” is unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Davis, 139. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019); see Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), unconstitutional); Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1215 (2018) (holding Immigration and Nationality Act’s “crime of violence” definition, 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), void for vagueness). Following Johnson, Petitioners challenged their § 924(c) convictions on constitutional vagueness grounds asserting that the predicate offense, federal bank robbery, was not categorically a crime of violence. The district court denied relief and both it and the Circuit denied the Petitioners certificates of appealability. Under this Court’s controlling precedent, a movant “need not show that he should prevail on the merits” to be granted a certificate of appealability. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983). Rather, a claim warrants issuance of a certificate if it presents a “ question of some substance,” ie., an issue (1) that is “debatable among jurists of reason’”; (2) “that a court could resolve in a different manner’”; (3) that is ““adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further’”; or (4) that is not “squarely foreclosed by statute, rule, or authoritative court decision, or .. . [that is not] lacking any factual basis in the record.” Id., at 893 n.4, 894. The question presented is: Can reasonable jurists debate whether federal armed bank robbery by intimidation is not a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) because the offense fails to require any intentional use, attempted use, or threatened use of violent physical force? i