Does an officer's seizure of an object only after crouching down, carefully examining it for several seconds, and obtaining another officer's second opinion, meet the requirement that the incriminating nature of an object observed in plain view be 'immediately apparent' under the Fourth Amendment's plain-view doctrine?

question presented is: Does an officer’s seizure of an object only after crouching down, carefully examining it for several seconds, and obtaining another officer’s second opinion, meet the requirement that the incriminating nature of an object observed in plain view be “immediately apparent” under the Fourth Amendment’s plain-view doctrine? 2. At trial, the government failed to elicit any testimony that the object retrieved from the glove compartment met the statutory definition of a “firearm.” Notwithstanding contrary authority from the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that the object itself was admitted into evidence and the jury, without further assistance or instruction, could determine on its own whether the object “will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(8)(A). The second question presented is: Can the government meet its burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense by admitting the object itself into evidence and providing no further guidance to the jury through testimony or otherwise on whether the object was capable of or designed to, or could be converted to, expel a projectile using an explosive? 3. During closing arguments, the prosecutor improperly vouched for the only witness (the driver) who offered any evidence that Petitioner possessed the alleged firearm by telling the jury that he (the prosecutor) believed the witness’s version. Trial counsel did not object. A divided Ninth Circuit found, notwithstanding contrary authority from this Court, from the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, and even from the Ninth Circuit, that the improper vouching of the only witness who provided any evidence as to the firearm count did not warrant reversal on plain error review, and in any event was offset by the district court’s general instructions to the jury that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. -il The third question presented is: Is reversal required on plain error review when a prosecutor improperly vouches for a co-defendant who provides the only evidence to support a count in the indictment, even when the trial court generally instructs the jury that the arguments of counsel are not evidence? lil