Does an offense that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness qualify as a crime of violence under the identical force clauses in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) and the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)?

QUESTION PRESENTED Before this Court decided Voisine v. United States, 136 8. Ct. 2272 (2016), all circuits agreed that an offense that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness does not qualify as a “violent felony” under the so-called “force clause” in the definition of “violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), or as a “crime of violence” under the identical force clause in the Guidelines at U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Although Voisine interpreted a materially different force clause in a statute relating to misdemeanor offenses (18 U.S.C. § 921(33)), some circuits, including the Sixth Circuit, relied on Voisine to abandon their previously unanimous reading of the force clause in the ACCA and the Guidelines, both of which relate to felony offenses and include more restrictive language. Five circuits, in contrast, have reaffirmed since Voisine that the force clause does not reach offenses that can be committed recklessly. The Eighth Circuit, has adopted a third rule, holding that while the force clause generally includes reckless crimes, it does not include crimes that can be accomplished by reckless driving. This Court must resolve the three-way split on this important question: Does an offense that can be committed with a mens rea of recklessness qualify as a crime of violence under the identical force clauses in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) and the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)? il