No. 19-6752

Jemone Lawrence Walker v. United States

Lower Court: Eleventh Circuit
Docketed: 2019-11-25
Status: Denied
Type: IFP
Response WaivedIFP Experienced Counsel
Tags: armed-career-criminal-act constitutional-vagueness curtis-johnson curtis-johnson-v-united-states elements-clause physical-force samuel-johnson-v-united-states sentencing-enhancement stokeling stokeling-v-united-states violent-felony
Key Terms:
DueProcess
Latest Conference: 2020-01-10
Question Presented (AI Summary)

Whether the Armed Career Criminal Act's elements clause is unconstitutionally vague

Question Presented (OCR Extract)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a 15-year mandatoryminimum sentence on any § 922(g) offender convicted of at least three qualifying predicate convictions. 18 U.S.C. §924(e)(1). As relevant here, a past conviction can qualify as an ACCA predicate if it is a “violent felony’—that is, “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that: qa) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The first clause is often called the elements clause. The first part of the second clause is often called the enumerated-offenses clause, and the second part is often called the residual clause. In Samuel Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), this Court held the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Thus, the only way an offense may now qualify as a “violent felony” is under the elements or enumerated-offenses clause. This case is about only the elements clause. For an offense to qualify as a predicate under the elements clause, it must have “physical force” as an element of the offense. In Curtis Johnson v. United States, this Court held that the term “physical force” means “violent force—that is, force capable of causing pain or injury to another person.” 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (emphasis added). In Stokeling v. United States, this Court clarified what it meant i when it said “capable” of causing pain or injury, holding that “[Curtis] Johnson [ ] does not require any particular degree of likelihood or probability that the force used will cause physical pain or injury; only potentiality.” 1398. Ct. 544, 554 (2019). This case presents the question the four-justice dissent in Stokeling alluded to—that is, whether, in light of Stokeling, the ACCA’s elements clause is unconstitutionally vague under Samuel Johnson’s reasoning. See 1398. Ct. at 564 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). ii

Docket Entries

2020-01-13
Petition DENIED.
2019-12-12
DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 1/10/2020.
2019-12-03
Waiver of right of respondent United States of America to respond filed.
2019-11-21
Petition for a writ of certiorari and motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis filed. (Response due December 26, 2019)

Attorneys

Jemone Lawrence Walker
Conrad Benjamin KahnFederal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Petitioner
Conrad Benjamin KahnFederal Public Defender, Middle District of Florida, Petitioner
United States of America
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent
Noel J. FranciscoSolicitor General, Respondent