It is a federal crime under both 18 U.S.C. §875 and §115 to threaten to injure the person (\.e.
physical body) of another, yet not legally settled as to whether such offense conduct also qualifies
to be defined as a "crime of violence " pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §16. Questions presented are:

1) Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001
(2015), a conviction for issuing a "true threat " requires proof of defendant 's subjective intent to
threaten injury upon the person (physical body) of another; or whether intent to threaten injury to
the reputation of another is enough to sustain a "true threat " conviction for felony "crime of
violence, " as upheld by Third Circuit 's interpretation of Elonis in this instant matter.

2) Whether, consistent with the Sixth Amendment and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), a defendant who is convicted for "threatened assault " under 18 U.S.C. §115 (after
admitting a threat to injure the reputation of another) can be subject to felony punishment for
offense conduct equally criminalized as misdemeanor "simple assault " under the same statute (as
per the lower court 's interpretation of Elonis). To restate the question: Whether 18 U. S.C. §115
is unconstitutionally vague under Apprendi for providing two different statutory maximum
penalties to punish identical offense conduct criminalized as both misdemeanor "simple assault "
and felony "threatened assault. "

3) Whether, consistent with McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), Dusky v. United
States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), Indiana v. Edwards, 554
U.S. 164 (2008), and the First and Fifth Amendments, a defendant can be prosecuted for "speech
crimes " committed in response to illegal threats of violence and terrorism orchestrated against his
family (and others) by the government, while simultaneously found "incompetent " to stand trial
after government doctors falsely interpret all threats perceived by defendant as resulting from
"schizophrenic delusions, " and wherein the court refuses to permit defendant his right to cross-
examine these doctors and prove their forgeries, and instead directs defendant (after changing the
law to criminalize threats to injure reputation) to enter an involuntary plea consistently declared
by defendant to be induced by threats of violence and terrorism (whether real or imaginary).

Whether a conviction for issuing a 'true threat' requires proof of defendant's subjective intent to threaten injury upon the person (physical body) of another