Were petitioner's due process rights violated by the Supreme Court of Georgia's overly broad application of the 'intrinsic evidence' rule?

QUESTIONS PRESENTED WERE PETITIONER'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS VIOLATED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA’S OVERLY BROAD APPLICATION OF THE “INTRINSIC EVIDENCE” RULE TO PETITIONER'S CASE? SHOULD THIS COURT RESOLVE THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE RULING BY THE SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA IN PETITIONER’S CASE AND THE PRECEDENT OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REGARDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE “INTRINSIC EVIDENCE” RULE TO JUSTIFY ADMISSION OF PRIOR BAD ACT EVIDENCE THAT DOES NOT OTHERWISE QUALIFY AS 404B EVIDENCE ON THE GROUNDS THAT IT “COMPLETES THE STORY OF THE CRIME”? SHOULD THIS COURT RESOLVE THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEAL ON THE “INTRINSIC EVIDENCE” RULE AND ADOPT THE PRECEDENT ESTABLISHED BY THED.C. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS?