Whether the categorical approach applies to determining if a state conviction triggers a sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED Federal law prohibits the transport, receipt, distribution, sale, and possession of visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct whose production involves the use of a real minor actually engaged in that conduct, commonly referred to as child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a). The penalties for this offense, outlined in subsection (b) of the statute, are enhanced for any person who has a prior conviction under the laws of any State relating to, inter alia, “the production, possession, receipt, mailing, sale, distribution, shipment, or transportation of child pornography.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1), (b)(2). The questions presented are: 1. Did the Seventh Circuit err in holding that the categorical approach does not apply when determining whether a state conviction triggers a sentencing enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)? 2. What effect, if any, does the “relating to” language in 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b) have on the categorical approach applied to determining whether a prior offense is properly considered a sentence-enhancing predicate? 3. Does Indiana Code § 35-42-4-4, which criminalizes the possession of material that is not child pornography and protected by the First Amendment, categorically “relate to” the possession of child pornography for the purposes of triggering the mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. Section 2252(b)?