Whether a sentencing court may consider a defendant's actual conduct in determining if an offense qualifies as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

Question Presented is: In applying the categorical or modified categorical approach to § 924(c)(3)(A), must a sentencing court limit its consideration to the elements of an offense or may a sentencing court instead ignore the elements of the crime and review all contemporaneous crimes of conviction to determine whether a defendant actually used force in committing the offense? This case also implicates this Court’s rulings on when a sentencing court may find that an offense has an element of “force” such that it qualifies as a crime of i violence under a statute’s elements clause. In Johnson v. United States, this Court held that the phrase “physical force” meant “violent force” between two concrete bodies that was “capable of causing physical pain or injuryL.]” 559 U.S. 133 138-40 (2010). Subsequently, in United States v. Castleman, this Court held that in the narrow context of domestic violence, “[i]t is impossible to cause bodily injury without applying force in the common-law sense.” 572 U.S. 157, 170 (2014). Circuit courts are split as to whether a statutory element requiring physical injury is sufficient to show that an offense also requires an implied element of physical force, even where the injury could realistically be caused by an omission. The second Question Presented is: Where an offense’s necessary element of physical injury can be satisfied by an omission, is that offense categorically a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause? ii