Whether a change in decisional law may constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6)

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits adhere to a categorical rule that a change in decisional law cannot qualify as an “exceptional circumstance” justifying relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). Moses v. Joyner, 815 F.3d 163, 168 (4th Cir. 2016); Raby v. Davis, 907 F.3d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 2018); Zagorski v. Mays, 907 F.3d 901, 905 (6th Cir. 2018); Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 631 (11th Cir. 2014). As Justice Sotomayor recently observed, the application of Rule 60(b)(6) in these circuits is in “potential tension” with this Court’s decision in Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), and is in conflict with decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Seventh Circuits. Crutsinger v. Davis, 140 8. Ct. 2, 2-3 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of certiorari). When affirming the denial of Mr. Gonzales’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion—which sought review of the district court’s denial of reasonably necessary expert funding in light of this Court’s decision in Ayestas v. Davis, 584 U.S. ___, 1388S. Ct. 1080 (2018)— the Fifth Circuit invoked its well-established circuit precedent that changes in decisional law alone are not exceptional for purposes of Rule 60(b)(6) and cannot justify relief. The question presented is: Whether a change in decisional law may constitute an extraordinary circumstance justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 1