Does a pending motion automatically toll the IADA's time-to-trial clock?

QUESTION PRESENTED The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (“JADA”), P.L. 91-538 (Dec. 9, 1970), amended by Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 100-690, Title VII, § 7059, 102 Stat. 4403 (Nov. 18, 1988), available at 18 U.S.C. Appx. 2—a compact adopted by the federal government, 48 states, and the District of Columbia— imposes certain procedural responsibilities on jurisdictions that prosecute a prisoner of another signatory. Among other things: [T]rial shall be commenced within one hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in the receiving State, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. IADA, 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 2, art. [V(c). But that period is “tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial.” IADA, § 2, art. VI(a). The “courts of appeals are divided” over whether pretrial motions toll the IADA’s time-to-trial clock. United States v. Whitning, 28 F.3d 1296 (1st Cir. 1994) (collecting cases). Some circuits say yes, to harmonize the IADA with the later-enacted Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (“STA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-74. Several state courts agree—even though the federal STA does not even apply to them. By contrast, two circuits, and several other state courts, hold the opposite. To resolve that split, the question presented here is the following: 1. Does a pending motion automatically toll the IADA’s time-to-trial clock, to the same extent as under the STA? i