Whether an abortion clinic may assert third-party standing on behalf of its hypothetical minor patients to challenge a statute requiring parental notice before abortion

QUESTIONS PRESENTED For decades Indiana has permitted a minor to have an abortion so long as she has parental consent or a bypass order from a juvenile court based on either her maturity or her best interests. Now, when a juvenile court permits an unemancipated minor to have an abortion, a new statute requires notice to her parents unless the court finds such notice to be against the minor’s best interests. The district court enjoined enforcement of this statute and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, 2-1, with a dissent by Judge Kanne. The en banc court denied rehearing by a vote of 6-5, with Judge Easterbrook writing a concurrence in denial (joined by Judge Sykes) saying that rehearing would be pointless because only this Court can decide how its abortion precedents apply to this situation. The questions presented are: 1. Whether an abortion clinic may assert thirdparty standing on behalf of its hypothetical minor patients to challenge a statute requiring parental notice before abortion. 2. Whether Indiana may, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, generally require lawyers for unemancipated minors to notify parents of courtauthorized abortions, subject to judicial bypass upon a finding that such notice would be against the minor’s best interests.