Did the delay in Petitioner's first appeal as of right from his criminal conviction violate the Due Process Clause?

QUESTION PRESENTED This Court has not previously decided when inordinate delay in criminal appeals violates the Due Process Clause. In the absence of guidance from this Court, two approaches have developed among the lower courts. E.g., Chatman v. Mancill, 626 S.E.2d 102, 107 (Ga. 2006) (cataloging the split). One group of courts applies the speedy trial framework set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 (1972), balancing four factors: “[l]Jength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 530. The other group of courts, however, reject the Barker framework and consider only “fairness and prejudice,” Lopez v. State, 769 P.2d 1276, 1288 (Nev. 1989) (collecting cases). This case—involving almost 15-year delay caused by a failure to appoint appellate counsel for the indigent Petitioner—presents this Court with the opportunity to resolve that split of authority. The question presented here is, therefore, the following: 1. Did the delay in Petitioner’s first appeal as of right from his criminal conviction violate the Due Process Clause? i