When a death-sentenced inmate's appointed attorney shows that expert services have likely utility and are of unusual character or duration, but cost more than the statutory limit, does a district court abuse its discretion by denying funding for the services?

QUESTION PRESENTED 1. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 was enacted to provide high quality legal representation and reasonably necessary funding for experts to prisoners sentenced to death. It requires appointed counsel to investigate possible issues for clemency and represent the prisoner during clemency proceedings. To obtain funding, a prisoner need not prove that he will obtain relief, but only that the funding is “reasonably necessary.” Ayestas v. Davis, 138 S.Ct. 1080, 1094 (2018). The “reasonably necessary” test requires only an assessment of the likely utility of the services requested. To obtain more than the statutory limit of $7,500 per 18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(2), the prisoner must show that the requested services are of an “unusual character or duration.” Attorney for Hummel identified two critical issues for clemency: (1) the investigation and preparation of a sociological report by an expert who has studied—and personally experienced—the military training to which Hummel was subjected in the Marines; and (2) a proper risk assessment about his “future dangerousness” by an expert qualified to conduct it and has worked with veterans and the other expert in a death-penalty case where the defendant—a veteran whose history is similar to Hummel’s—received life instead of the death penalty. The district court authorized funding of up to the statutory limit $7,500 per 18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(2), allowing the first expert’s work, but far below what is reasonably necessary for the expert who was to perform the risk assessment. Question: When the appointed attorney for a death-sentenced inmate shows that expert services have likely utility—and are of unusual character or duration—but cost more than the statutory limit of $7,500 per 18 U.S.C. § 3599(g)(2), does a district court abuse its discretion by denying funding for the services?