Whether proximate causation under the MVRA must be analyzed by the use of the 'middle road approach' or the 'created circumstance approach'

QUESTION PRESENTED Even after Robers v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1854 (2014), the circuits . remain dangerously divided over what method to apply when determining proximate cause and what is a sufficient intervening factor breaking the causal chain of proximate cause pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. This Court and ten other circuits -the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits — apply a “created circumstance approach” holding that, “The basic question that a proximate cause requirement presents is whether the harm _alleged has a sufficient close connection to the conduct at issue.” Robers v. ; United States, 134 S.Ct 1854 (2014). Nevertheless, the Second Circuit to determine a defendant’s liability under the MVRA has repeatedly applied the “middle road approach” holding that, “[A] defendant is liable under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act to a victim if any subsequent action contributing to the victim’s loss is related to the defendant's conduct.” United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.d 579, 590(1st Cir. 1997). This has resulted in a conflict with this Court’s precedents and conflicts with ten other circuits, in addition to illegal restitution orders. : ‘ The Question Presented is: Whether proximate causation under the MVRA must be analyzed by the use of the "middle road approach," as adopted by the First and Second Circuit or by the "created circumstance approach," as consistently followed by this . Court and ten other circuits and as argued by Petitioner Cassandra Cean? Whether the Sixth Amendment forbids restitution against a criminal defendant who has not been afforded the opportunity to completely present the defense of intervening cause when victims’ fail to produce ordered documentary evidence?